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1 Introduction
I propose a dynamic approach to the strategic use of non-price tools in a
di¤erential game model of vertical di¤erentiation.. Non-price variables typ-
ically include product and/or process R&D, product di¤erentiation and ad-
vertising, that …rms may use in isolation or together, so as to increase the
pro…tability of their price or quantity strategies.
Ever since the pioneering work of Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen
(1978) on the provision of product quality by a monopolist, vertical di¤erenti-
ation has received wide attention within the theory of industrial organization.
Several issues have been investigated in oligopoly models where …rms supply
goods of di¤erent quality. In Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked
and Sutton (1982, 1983), the so-called …niteness property is established, ac-
cording to which the number of …rms that can survive in a vertically is …nite.
This result holds if unit costs of quality are ‡at enough, and the overall cost
associated with the improvement of quality is an R&D cost unrelated with
the scale of production. In their approach, the only costs explicitly mod-
elled is a …xed cost which is assumed to be exogenous and arbitrarily small.
Therefore, the …niteness property essentially depends on demand rather than
technological conditions. The in‡uence of the shape of the cost function on
prices, market shares and pro…ts is the topic of several contributions, where
the cost of quality is alternatively related or unrelated with the output scale.1
More recent contributions deal several aspects of the technology associ-
ated with product innovation in vertically di¤erentiated markets, through
either independent ventures (Beath et al., 1987; Dutta et al., 1995; van Dijk,
1996; Rosenkranz, 1997) or joint ventures (Motta, 1992; Rosenkranz, 1995;
Lambertini, 2000; Lambertini et al., 2000). A result common to all these
contributions is that the highest quality good is more pro…table than all in-
ferior varieties, irrespective of the speci…cation of the cost function and, in
particular, notwithstanding the assumption, common to all this literature,
that the higher the quality of a good, the higher its cost.
With the exception of Beath et al. (1987) and Dutta et al. (1995),
modelling quality improvement as an uncertain innovation race, the above
literature adopts a static approach where …rms set qualities and prices (or
outputs) in two stages. To the best of my knowledge, the problem of quality
supply has been investigated in optimal control and di¤erential game models
only in relation with advertising strategies aimed at the formation of goodwill
1For models where the development of quality bears upon variable costs, see Moorthy
(1988); Champsaur and Rochet (1989); Cremer and Thisse (1994); Lambertini (1996). For
those where quality represents a …xed cost, see Aoki and Prusa (1997); Lehmann-Grube
(1997) and Lambertini (1999). A comparative evaluation is in Motta (1993).
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(see Kotowitz and Mathewson, 1979; Conrad, 1985; and Ringbeck, 1985).2
I investigate a di¤erential duopoly game where …rms supply goods of dif-
ferent quality, which is the result of capital accumulation over time. The
setup of market demand is borrowed from well known static models. The
introduction of dynamic capital accumulation over time allows me to show
that several results of the static approach are not robust. First of all, the sus-
tainability of the duopoly regime depends upon the non-negativity of …rms’
pro…ts, which in turn depends on the size of their respective investment in
R&D to improve quality. Second, the di¤erential game admits quality ranges
where the R&D e¤ort of the low quality …rm is larger than the high quality
…rm’s. Third, the dynamic model produces situations where the low quality
…rm earns higher pro…ts than the high quality …rm.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a
brief review of the static model. The di¤erential game is described in section
3 and discussed in section 4. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries: a summary of the static two-
stage game
Here I brie‡y summarise the static two-stage model analysed in several contri-
butions (Choi and Shin, 1992; Dutta et al., 1995; Wauthy, 1996; Lambertini
et al., 2000, inter alia).
Two single-product …rms, labelled as H and L, supply goods of qualities
Q > qH ¸ qL ¸ 0: Consumers are uniformly distributed with density equal to
one over the interval [£¡ 1 ; £] ; with £ > 1. Therefore, the total population
of consumers is represented by a unit square. Each consumer is indexed by
a marginal willingness to pay for quality µ 2 [£¡ 1 ; £] ; and his net utility
from consumption is:
U =
(
µqi ¡ pi ¸ 0 if he buys
0 if he doesn’t buy
(1)
where pi is the price of the good supplied by …rm i at time t:
All costs are assumed to be nil, which entails that any quality improve-
ment is costless.3 Demands for the two goods are:
xH = £¡ µH ; xL = µH ¡ µL ; (2)
2For exhaustive surveys on dynamic advertising, see Sethi (1977); Jørgensen (1982);
Feichtinger and Jørgensen (1983); Erickson (1991); Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994).
3Dutta et al. (1995) and Lambertini et al. (2000) assume that quality improvements
require an R&D cost which, however, is not explicitly de…ned as a function of quality.
Therefore, such a cost does not a¤ect …rst order conditions.
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where µH is the marginal willingness to pay for quality characterising the
consumer who is indi¤erent between qH and qL at the price vector fpH ; pLg ;
i.e., it is the solution to:
µHqH ¡ pH = µHqL ¡ pL , µH = pH ¡ pL
qH ¡ qL ; (3)
while µL is the marginal evaluation of quality associated with the consumer
who is indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at
all:
µL =
pL
qL
: (4)
Firms’ pro…ts, which coincide with revenues, are:
¼H = pH
Ã
£¡ pH ¡ pL
qH ¡ qL
!
; ¼L = pL
Ã
pH ¡ pL
qH ¡ qL ¡
pL
qL
!
: (5)
Firms play simultaneously a non-cooperative two-stage game, where they set
qualities in the …rst stage and price in the second. As usual, the solution
concept is subgame perfection by backward induction. The outcome is sum-
marised in the following Proposition, the complete proof of which can be
found in Choi and Shin (1992) and Wauthy (1996) (superscript sp stands for
subgame perfect):
Proposition 1 At the subgame perfect equilibrium,
² qualities are qspH = Q and qspL = 4Q=7;
² output levels are xspH = 7£=12 and xspL = 7£=24 = xspH=2;
² prices are pspH = £Q=4 and pspH = £Q=14:
This also allows to establish that xspH + x
sp
L < 1 for all £ < 8=7: Hence,
for all £ ¸ 8=7; the demand functions (2) are not valid and the model must
be re-speci…ed with xL = µH ¡ (£¡ 1):4
Moreover, xspH = 7£=12 implies that x
sp
L > 0 i¤ £ < 12=7: Therefore,
Proposition 1 produces the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 For all £ ¸ 12=7; the market is monopolised by the high quality
…rm.
4For the analysis if this case, see Tirole (1988, appendix to ch. 7), Rosenkranz (1995)
and Wauthy (1996).
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Corollary 1 is an instance of the so-called …niteness property (see Gab-
szewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983), which estab-
lishes that the demand structure of a vertically di¤erentiated market allows
for a …nite number of …rms operating with positive demand and pro…ts at the
subgame perfect equilibrium. In particular, the above case is what Shaked
and Sutton label as a natural monopoly. They use consumer income, while
here I use the marginal evaluation for quality, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980). It can be easily shown that the
two approaches are equivalent, provided that consumer’s utility function is
concave in income.5
For future reference, it is worth noting that the (exogenously imposed)
upper bound of the quality spectrum, Q, which is usually referred to as the
highest technologically feasible quality, generates the corner solution qspH = Q;
as the revenues of …rm H are everywhere increasing in qH : Being quality
improvements costless, without such a boundary qH would become in…nitely
high. Moreover, it is reasonable to think that the upper bound Q should be
endogenised, in the sense that …rms’ R&D investments (in particular, …rm
H’s) should increase the feasible quality range.6
3 The dynamic model
Let the market exist over t 2 [0 ; 1) : At any t; as in the static version,
a constant population of consumers is uniformly distributed with density
equal to one over the interval [£¡ 1 ; £] ; with £ 2 (1 ; 4=3).7 Again, the
total mass of consumer is 1: Each consumer is characterised by a marginal
willingness to pay for quality µ 2 [£¡ 1 ; £] ; and his net instantaneous
utility from consumption is now de…ned as:
U =
(
µqi(t)¡ pi(t) ¸ 0 if he buys
0 if he doesn’t buy
(6)
where qi(t) is the quality and pi(t) is the price of the good supplied by …rm
i at time t: Two single-product …rms, labelled as H and L, supply goods of
5Under this condition, µ = ¯=uy; where uy ´ @u(y)=@y is the marginal utility of income
and ¯ is a positive parameter. If uyy ´ @2u(y)=@y2 · 0; the marginal willingness to pay
for quality increases as income increases (see Tirole, 1988, ch. 2).
6Of course this idea can be developed in a static context by assuming, e.g., a convex
cost of quality improvement. This is investigated in Motta (1993), Lambertini (1996, 1999,
2000), and Lehmann-Grube (1997), inter alia. However, in such a case the derivation of
the subgame perfect equilibrium requires numerical calculations.
7The meaning of the upper bound to £ will become clear in the remainder of the
analysis. See below.
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qualities 1 > qH(t) ¸ qL(t) ¸ 0:
The quality of …rm i’s product increases over time according to the fol-
lowing dynamics:
@qi(t)
@t
= a
q
ki(t) ; (7)
where ki(t) is the instantaneous investment of …rm i in an R&D process aimed
at improving product quality, and a is a positive parameter. The initial
condition for …rm i is qi(0) = qi0 ¸ 0: The instantaneous cost associated to
the R&D activity is Ci (ki(t)) = ½ki(t); i.e., I assume that the rental price of
the capital input be equal to the discount rate ½:
Each …rm bears no costs other than Ci (ki(t)) : That is, operative pro-
duction costs are assumed to be nil, and therefore instantaneous pro…ts are
given by the di¤erence between revenues and the cost of investment.
The de…nition of market demands is analogous to the static setup. At
any t; market demands for the two varieties are de…ned as follows:
xH(t) = £¡ µH(t) ; xL(t) = µH(t)¡ µL(t) ; (8)
where µH(t) is the marginal willingness to pay for quality characterising
the consumer who is indi¤erent between qH(t) and qL(t) at the price vec-
tor fpH(t) ; pL(t)g :
µH(t) =
pH(t)¡ pL(t)
qH(t)¡ qL(t) ; (9)
while µL(t) is:
µL(t) =
pL(t)
qL(t)
: (10)
Accordingly, instantaneous pro…ts are:
¼H(t) = pH(t)
Ã
£¡ pH(t)¡ pL(t)
qH(t)¡ qL(t)
!
¡ ½kH(t) ; (11)
¼L(t) = pL(t)
Ã
pH(t)¡ pL(t)
qH(t)¡ qL(t) ¡
pL(t)
qL(t)
!
¡ ½kL(t) ; (12)
provided that xH(t) + xL(t) · 1:
Control variables are the price pi(t) and the R&D e¤ort ki(t); while quality
qi(t) is the state variable. Firms play simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
Given that the dynamic constraint (7) is non-linear, I will con…ne to the
open-loop solution concept. Although the open-loop solution is only weakly
time consistent, in some circumstances it can be justi…ed by considering that
6
it may be extremely costly for …rms to change long-run investment plans at
any intermediate date.8 Firm i’s Hamiltonian is:
Hi(t) = e¡½t ¢
½
¼i(t) + ¸i(t)a
q
ki(t)
¾
; (13)
where ¸i(t) = ¹i(t)e
½t; and ¹i(t) is the co-state variable associated to qi(t):
The optimality conditions are (henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I will drop
the indication of time):
@HH
@pH
=
pL ¡ 2pH +£ (qH ¡ qL)
qH ¡ qL = 0 ; (14)
@HL
@pL
=
pHqL ¡ 2pLqH
qL (qH ¡ qL) = 0 ; (15)
@Hi
@ki
= ¡½ + a¸i
2
p
ki
= 0 ; i = H;L ; (16)
¡@HH
@qH
=
@¹H
@t
) @¸H
@t
= ½¸H ¡ pH (pH ¡ pL)
(qH ¡ qL)2
; (17)
¡@HL
@qL
=
@¹L
@t
) @¸L
@t
= ½¸L ¡ pL (pHq
2
L ¡ 2pLqHqL + pLq2H)
[qL (qH ¡ qL)]2
; (18)
lim
t!1 ¹i(t) ¢ qi(t) = 0 ; i = H;L : (19)
Solving (14-15) yields optimal prices:
p¤H =
2£qH (qH ¡ qL)
(4qH ¡ qL) ; p
¤
L =
£qL (qH ¡ qL)
(4qH ¡ qL) ; (20)
with p¤H > p
¤
L > 0 for all qH > qL: If qH = qL; then p
¤
H = p
¤
L = 0 and the
allocation of market demand across …rms is not determined. In such a case
however, independently of the allocation of costumers, revenues are zero and
therefore pro…ts are negative for both …rms. It is worth noting that the above
expressions coincide with the solutions of the price stage of the static game
(see section 2).
8Indeed, the main di¤erence between the open-loop solution and the closed-loop and
feedback ones is that in the former, players decide by looking at the clock (i.e., calendar
time), while in the latter, they decide by looking at the stock (i.e., the past history of the
game). Whether the second picture is more realistic than the …rst has to be evaluated
within the speci…c model being used, in connection with the kind of story the model itself
tries to account for (Clemhout and Wan, 1994, p. 812). See also Bas¸ar and Olsder (1982,
19952), in particular ch. 6.
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Now, from (16) I obtain:
¸i =
2½
p
ki
a
(21)
and
ki =
Ã
a¸i
2½
!2
(22)
which yields the dynamics of …rm i’s R&D e¤ort:
@ki
@t
=
a2¸i
2½2
¢ @¸i
@t
: (23)
Then, I can rewrite (23) for both …rms, using (17), (18), (20) and (21), to
obtain:
@kH
@t
/
q
kH
·
½2
q
kH (4qH ¡ qL)2 ¡ a£2qH (2qH ¡ qL)
¸
; (24)
@kL
@t
/
q
kL
·
2½2
q
kL (4qH ¡ qL)2 ¡ a£2q2H
¸
: (25)
Therefore, f@kH=@t = 0 ; @kL=@t = 0g when either kH = kL = 0; in which
case qi = qi0 forever, or
kH =
a2£4q2H (2qH ¡ qL)2
½4 (4qH ¡ qL)4
; kL =
a2£4q4H
4½4 (4qH ¡ qL)4
: (26)
In the remainder I shall focus upon (26), which depicts the economically
relevant situation. Capital levels (26) imply the following result:
Lemma 1 For all
qH 2
0@qL ; 2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
1A ;
we have kH < kL : For all
qH ¸
2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
;
we have kH ¸ kL :
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Proof. To prove the Lemma, observe …rst that
kH ¡ kL = a
2£4q2H
4½4 (4qH ¡ qL)4
¢
³
16q2H + 4q
2
L ¡ 16qHqL
´
= 0 (27)
at
qH =
2qL §
q
4q2L + 1
4
;
with the smaller root being always negative, and the larger root being higher
than qL. Then, consider that the coe¢cient of q2H in (27) is positive. This
concludes the proof.
In contrast with the static literature on R&D investment aimed at in-
creasing product quality (see, e.g., Dutta et al. 1995; Lehmann-Grube, 1997;
Lambertini et al., 2000), in the dynamic setup adopted here it is not gener-
ally true that the high quality …rm carries out a higher e¤ort than the rival
in improving product quality.
Now consider qualities. According to (7), qualities seems to be always
increasing over time. Thus, the ‡ow of investments carried out by the high
quality …rm keeps pushing the upwards the top feasible quality over time.
However, under the speci…cation of the demand function as in (8), there
exists an upper bound to the quality ratio qL=qH : To verify this, observe
that plugging (20) into xL yields the following expression:
xL =
£qH
(4qH ¡ qL) (28)
which is increasing in qL: When
qL = (4¡ 3£) qH 2 (0 ; qH) for all £ 2
µ
1 ;
4
3
¶
; (29)
we have µL = £ ¡ 1 and xH + xL = 1; i.e., the market is fully covered.9
Moreover, also qH is increasing in qL : The intuition behind this phenomenon
is that any increase in the low quality enhances total demand, because it
increases the surplus of low-income consumers. This, in turn, causes …rm
H to increase the quality of her own variety as well, by strategic comple-
mentarity, and this generates a larger demand for the high quality good.
In particular, xH = 1 and xL = 0 for all qL ¸ 2 (2¡£) qH ; provided
9For all qL ¸ (4 ¡ 3£) qH or £ ¸ 4=3; the market is completely covered and the demand
functions (8) are no longer valid. The model must be reformulated taking into account
that xH = £ ¡ µH and xL = µH ¡ £ + 1:
9
£ 2 (1 ; 2) : However, 2 (2¡£) > (4¡ 3£) : Therefore, as long as the mar-
ket is only partially covered, or at most is fully covered at the margin with
qL = (4¡ 3£) qH ; the market demand for the low quality good is strictly
positive. At qL = (4¡ 3£) qH ; we have:
x¤H =
2
3
; x¤L =
1
3
;
p¤H = 2 (£¡ 1) qH ; p¤L = (4¡ 3£) (£¡ 1) qH ; (30)
k¤H =
a2 (3£¡ 2)2
81½4
; k¤L =
a2
324½4
:
where k¤H > k
¤
L : Under full market coverage, instantaneous pro…ts amount
to:
¼¤H =
108½3 (£¡ 1) qH ¡ a2 (3£¡ 2)2
81½3
;
¼¤L =
81½3 (7£¡ 3£2 ¡ 4) qH ¡ a2
324½3
:
(31)
4 Discussion
Here I would like to discuss some qualitative properties of the dynamic model,
as well as the sustainability of duopoly at qL=qH = (4¡ 3£) ; i.e., when
full market coverage obtains at the margin. A further issue consists in the
comparative assessment of the dynamic model vs the static one.
First of all, recall from Lemma 1 that
k¤H ¸ k¤L i¤ qH ¸
2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
: (32)
For (32) to hold at qL=qH = (4¡ 3£) ; the following inequality must be
satis…ed:
qL
4¡ 3£ ¸
2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
;
which is true i¤
qL ¸ 4¡ 3£
4
p
£¡ 1 > 0 for all £ 2
µ
1 ;
4
3
¶
:
This produces the following result:
Proposition 2 For all qL 2
Ã
0 ;
4¡ 3£
4
p
£¡ 1
!
; we have that
qH =
qL
4¡ 3£ <
2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
) k¤H < k¤L :
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For all qL ¸ 4¡ 3£
4
p
£¡ 1 ; we have that
qH =
qL
4¡ 3£ ¸
2qL +
q
4q2L + 1
4
) k¤H ¸ k¤L :
In words, Proposition 2 says that, contrary to the well known view
adopted in the static approach to vertical di¤erentiation, a situation where
the high quality …rm invests less than the rival in quality-improving activities
is indeed admissible. As long as qL is su¢ciently low, there is no incentive
for …rm H to produce a larger R&D e¤ort than …rm L does.
Now consider the sustainability of the duopoly regime. This relates to
the …niteness property (Shaked and Sutton, 1983) according to which the
number of …rms that can survive in a vertically di¤erentiated market with
positive demands, prices above marginal costs and positive pro…ts is …nite.
Using a static approach, Shaked and Sutton derive this property on the
basis of market a-uence, under the assumption of arbitrarily small …xed
(exogenous) costs. If so, the condition such that, e.g., xH = 1 can be easily
established. Accordingly, the market is labelled as a natural monopoly in
that there exists no demand for a low quality good. The same procedure can
be used to derive condition for a natural oligopoly with any number of …rms.
However, in the dynamic setting there are non-negligible costs associated
to the development of product quality, and therefore the sustainability of
either the monopoly or the duopoly regime depends upon the non-negativity
of pro…ts (31).
The positivity of ¼¤L requires the following condition to be met:
qH >
a2
108½2 (7£¡ 3£2 ¡ 4) ´ eqH > 0 for all £ 2
µ
1 ;
4
3
¶
: (33)
The pro…ts of the high quality …rm are positive i¤:
qH >
a2 (3£¡ 2)2
108½2 (£¡ 1) ´ bqH > 0 for all £ 2
µ
1 ;
4
3
¶
: (34)
The following is a relevant complement:
¼¤H > ¼
¤
L i¤ qH >
a2 (6£¡ 5) (2£¡ 1)
108½2 (£¡ 1) ´ qH > 0 for all £ 2
µ
1 ;
4
3
¶
:
(35)
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It is quickly established that
qH > bqH > eqH > 0 for all £ 2
Ã
1 ;
5 +
p
5
6
!
;
0 < qH < bqH < eqH for all £ 2
Ã
5 +
p
5
6
;
4
3
!
:
(36)
This allows me to formulate the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose qL = (4¡ 3£) qH ; so that the market is fully covered
at the margin. If so, then:
A] For all £ 2
Ã
1 ;
5 +
p
5
6
!
; we have qH > bqH > eqH > 0 and
1. no …rm supplies the market if qH 2 (0 ; eqH) ;
2. the market is a duopoly with …rm H operating at negative pro…ts
if qH 2 (eqH ; bqH) ; because ¼¤L > 0 > ¼¤H in this interval;
3. the market is a duopoly if qH 2 (bqH ; qH) ; with ¼¤L > ¼¤H > 0 ;
4. the market is a duopoly if qH > qH ; with ¼
¤
H > ¼
¤
L > 0 :
B] For all £ 2
Ã
5 +
p
5
6
;
4
3
!
; we have 0 < qH < bqH < eqH and
1. no …rm supplies the market if qH 2 (0 ; bqH) ;
2. …rm H is a monopolist if qH 2 (bqH ; eqH) ; because ¼¤H > 0 > ¼¤L in
this interval;
3. the market is a duopoly if qH > eqH ; with ¼¤H > ¼¤L > 0 :
As qH keeps increasing over time, regimes A.1,2,3,4 or B.1,2,3 are al-
ternatively to be observed as time goes by, depending upon the level of £:
From an economic standpoint, the most interesting feature emerging from
Theorem 1 is that, if the market is not su¢ciently rich (i.e., in case A), then
the low quality good is more pro…table than the high quality good, as long
as qH < qH : This strongly contrasts with the results derived by the static
analysis, where the pro…ts of the high quality …rm are always larger than the
pro…ts of the low-quality …rm. In the present setting, …rm H always earns
positive pro…ts if and only qH0 > bqH :
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Finally, comparing the results concerning the dynamic model against
those derived from the static one (see section 2), there emerges no inter-
nal optimum for the high quality level in both models. However, while the
upper bound Q of the interval of technologically feasible quality is superim-
posed to the static model, the dynamic model shows that the top quality
level increases over time as …rm H keeps investing in R&D activities.
Moreover, the two models yields qualitatively equivalent predictions in
terms of the quality ratio (i.e., qL=qH = 4=7), prices, quantities and pro…ts
when £ = 8=7 < 4=3: The admissible range of £ for the duopoly equilibrium
to hold under partial market coverage is larger in the di¤erential (open-loop)
game that in the static (two-stage) game. In particular, a straightforward
comparison between qNL = 4Q=7 and qL = (4¡ 3£) qH yields the following
…nal result:
Proposition 3 For all £ 2
µ
1 ;
8
7
¶
; the quality ratio
qL
qH
is higher in the
di¤erential game than in the static game.
5 Concluding remarks
I have analysed a di¤erential game where …rms, through capital accumula-
tion over time, supply vertically di¤erentiated goods. The explicit treatment
of R&D activity as a capital accumulation process proves that several results
seemingly well established in the static approach are not robust. In partic-
ular, I have shown three main results: (i) the sustainability of the duopoly
regime is conditional upon the level of …rms’ R&D investments; (ii) there are
quality ranges where the low quality …rm invests more than the high quality
…rm; (ii) there exist quality ranges where the low quality …rm’s pro…ts are
larger than the high quality …rm’s.
In consideration of the large number of economically relevant issues asso-
ciated with the supply of product quality in competitive environments, the
foregoing analysis represent a preliminary step. Many extensions, e.g., dy-
namic investment in demand-increasing advertising or the accumulation of
capacity for production, are left for future research.
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